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In this paper, we introduce a general framework for situations with decision making under uncertainty
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1. Introduction In this paper, we consider situations with multiple players, who choose
strategies to in°uence their expected pro¯ts. We assume two decision epochs for an individual
player. First, he decides on a strategy to play under uncertainty of the future state of the world,
which a®ects the outcome of the played strategy. After the uncertainty is resolved, the player can
take a recourse action that compensates for any adverse e®ects that might have been experienced
as a result of the chosen strategy. The optimal strategies and recourse actions for the players are
determined by the solution of a two stage stochastic optimization problem. These players can also
cooperate in a coalition. In this case, the players in the coalition coordinate their strategies and
recourse actions to maximize their total expected pro¯t.
Many real life situations with decision making under uncertainty can be modeled using two
stage stochastic programming. Several applications appeared in the supply chain literature. One
example is the analysis of multi-product inventory systems with substitution. A series of papers
analyzed these systems with random demand (see Bassok et al. [2] and Rao et al. [18]) and random
yield (see Hsu and Bassok [11]), where in the ¯rst period a production decision is made and
after uncertainty is resolved an allocation decision follows. Another application concerns inventory
systems with transshipment. Herer and Rashit [10] considered a two-location inventory system
with ¯xed and joint replenishment costs and they developed the properties of optimal decisions.
Besides the above applications, Do· gru et al. [7] studied a base stock policy for an assemble to
order system where the products have common components. They developed an heuristic where
the stock levels are set by solving a two-stage stochastic program. Moreover, the solution provides a
lower-bound for the system performance. van Mieghem and Rudi [23] introduced a class of models,
called newsvendor networks, that provide a framework to study various problems of stochastic
capacity investment and inventory management. Their approach is based on a similar two-stage
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stochastic programming technique as in this paper. All of the papers above, di®erent from us,
assume single ownership of the problem and focus on the determination of optimal decisions or
developing e®ective heuristics. Anupindi et al. [1], Granot and So· si¶ c [8] and Rudi et al. [19] analyzed
the performance of decentralized systems, where the centralized (benchmark) performance is given
by the solution of a two-stage stochastic program.
In this paper, we provide a general framework for situations in which multiple players collabo-
rate by coordinating their strategies and recourse actions to maximize their total pro¯ts. A main
question is how the increased pro¯ts should be shared among the members of the cooperation.
Cooperative game theory mainly studies this issue and proposes the core concept for stability of
the cooperation. The core is the set of all stable pro¯t divisions such that no group of players would
like to split o® from cooperation and form a smaller coalition. We provide su±cient conditions for
the associated cooperative games to have non-empty cores. From a similar point of view, several
papers studied cooperation in a newsvendor setting to bene¯t from inventory pooling (see Hartman
et al. [9], MÄ uller et al. [13], Ä Ozen et al. [15], Ä Ozen et al. [16], Ä Ozen and So· si¶ c [17], Slikker et al. [21]
and Slikker et al. [22]). We remark that these studies ¯t into our general framework. Moreover,
our framework covers several other situations in which the uncertainty deals with other aspects
in the system, e.g., random yield. Nonemptiness of the core is also investigated in the literature
dealing with investments. Borm et al. [4] studied ¯rms' cooperative investments in capital deposits
and de Waegenaere et al. [6] considered a cooperative investment situation where the ¯rms bundle
their resources to invest in long term projects. Both studies assume a deterministic setting. In this
paper, we consider a two-stage stochastic variant of these problems as well.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we give preliminaries on positively
homogeneous functions and cooperative game theory. In section 3, we introduce a framework for
situations with decision making under uncertainty and cooperation possibilities, and we focus on
a special class of situations, called stochastic cooperative decision situations. This class captures
a broad range of cooperation situations under uncertainty. We show that the cooperative games
associated with these situations are totally balanced and, hence, they have non-empty cores. After-
wards, in section 4, we provide some example situations that can be analyzed in this framework.
We conclude the paper with further discussions in section 5.
2. Preliminaries In this section, we give preliminaries on positively homogeneous functions
and cooperative game theory.
A function f on I R




Note that if a function f is positively homogeneous, then f(0) = 0. Moreover, all linear functions
are positively homogeneous.
Theorem 1. Let f be a function from I R
n to I R. If f is a positively homogeneous concave
function, then for every ¸1 ¸0;:::;¸m ¸0 and x1;:::;xm 2I R
n
f(¸1x1 +:::+¸mxm)¸¸1f(x1)+:::+¸mf(xm): (1)
Proof. Without loss of generality, we may assume that ¸i >0 for every i2f1;::;mg. We have
f(¸1x1 +:::+¸mxm) = f(
m X
i=1















































The second equality follows since f is positively homogeneous. The inequality follows from concav-
ity of f. This completes the proof. ¤
Cooperative game theory deals with situations, where a group of players cooperate by coordi-
nating their actions to obtain a joint pro¯t. It is usually assumed that binding agreements between
the players are the mean of the cooperation. A main question of concern is how this pro¯t will be
divided among the cooperating players.
Let N be a ¯nite set of players, N =f1;:::;ng. A subset of N is called a coalition. A function v,
assigning a value v(S) to every coalition S µ N with v(;) = 0, is called a characteristic function.
The value v(S) is interpreted as the maximum total pro¯t that coalition S can obtain through
cooperation. Assuming that the bene¯t of a coalition S can be transferred between the players of S,
a pair (N;v) is called a cooperative game with transferable utility (TU-game) or a game in coalitional
form. For a game (N;v), S ½ N and S 6= ;, the subgame (S;vjS) is de¯ned by vjS(T) = v(T) for
each coalition T µS.
In reality, the players are not primarily interested in bene¯ts of a coalition but in their individual
bene¯ts that they make out of that coalition. A division is a payo® vector y = (yi)i2N 2 I R
N,
specifying for each player i2N the bene¯t yi. A division y is called e±cient if
P
i2N yi =v(N) and
individually rational if yi ¸v(fig) for all i2N. Individual rationality means that every player gets
at least as much as what he could obtain by staying alone. The set of all individually rational and




i2N yi =v(N) and yi ¸v(fig) for each i2Ng:




i2N yi =v(N) and
P
i2S yi ¸v(S) for each S µNg:
Thus, the core consists of all imputations in which no group of players has an incentive to split o®
from the grand coalition N and form a smaller coalition, because they collectively receive at least
as much as what they can obtain by cooperating on their own. Note that the core of a game can
be empty.
Bondareva [3] and Shapley [20] independently made a general characterization of games with
a non-empty core by the notion of balancedness. Let us de¯ne the vector eS for all S µ N by
eS
i = 1 for all i 2 S and eS
i = 0 for all i 2 NnS. A map · : 2Nnf;g ! [0;1] is called a balanced
map if
P
S22Nnf;g·(S)eS = eN. Further, a game (N;v) is called balanced if for every balanced
map ·:2Nnf;g![0;1] it holds that
P
S22Nnf;g·(S)v(S)·v(N). The following theorem is due to
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Theorem 2. Let (N;v) be a TU-game. Then Core(v)6=; if and only if (N;v) is balanced.
A TU-game (N;v) is called totally balanced if it is balanced and each of its subgames is balanced
as well.
3. Model Let N be a set of players. Each player i 2 N is subject to uncertainty, which is
represented by a random variable (or signal) Xi taking values in ¨i. The players can either work
alone or they can cooperate in a coalition. Consider a coalition S 22Nnf;g. Let xS =(xi)i2S be a
realization of random vector XS =(Xi)i2S taking values in ¨S =
Q
i2S ¨i. Before the realization of
the random vector XS, the players in the coalition jointly choose a strategy qS from the strategy
space QS µ I R
B with B 2 I N. After observing realization xS of XS, the players decide on a joint
recourse action mS from the action space MS(qS;xS) µ I R
B£N, which depends on qS and xS. We
assume for all mS 2 MS(qS;xS) that mS
i = 0 if i = 2 S since the coordinates of the players outside
of coalition S are irrelevant for the coalition. We denote the map (qS;xS) 7! MS(qS;xS) shortly
by MS. There is a cost associated with each strategy of the coalition. Suppose the coalition plays
strategy qS, then it pays a cost C(qS), where C :I R
B !I R. If the coalition plays recourse action mS
for realization xS of the random vector, each player in the coalition makes a revenue Hi(mS
i ;xi),
where mS
i 2 I R
B is the i'th coordinate of mS and Hi : I R












A tuple (N;(Xi)i2N;(QS;MS)S22Nnf;g;C;(Hi)i2N) with entities as above is called a stochastic
cooperative decision situation if the following conditions hold:
(i) For all T µ N, all qT 2 QT and every realization xT of XT,
maxm2MT (qT ;xT )ZT(m;xT) exists.
(ii) For all T µN and all qT 2QT, EXT[maxm2MT (qT ;¢)ZT(m;¢)] exists.
















(v) For all T µ N, every balanced map ·T : 2Tnf;g ! [0;1], every realization xT of XT, every
(qS)SµT 2
Q
SµT QS and every (mS)SµT 2
Q

















(vi) For all i2N and all realizations xi of Xi, Hi(¢;xi) is a concave function.
(vii) C is a positively homogeneous convex function.
The ¯rst three conditions guarantee that optimal strategies and recourse actions that maximize
the total expected pro¯t exist for every coalition, and that the expected pro¯t of a coalition under
optimal strategies and recourse actions is well de¯ned. Conditions (iv) and (v) simply state that
every balanced collection of strategies and recourse actions of coalitions S µT determines a feasible
strategy and recourse action for coalition T. Condition (vi) states that the revenue of a player
is a concave function of his recourse action. The last condition states that the cost function is a
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Suppose that coalition S plays strategy qS 2 QS, and realization xS of random vector XS
occurs. Let mS¤(qS;xS) be an optimal recourse action, which exists by condition (i). We refer to
ZS(mS¤(qS;xS);xS) as zS(qS;xS), which is the maximum total revenue that coalition S can achieve
by playing its optimal recourse action.
In a stochastic cooperative decision situation, individual players or coalitions are assumed to be
interested in their expected pro¯ts, while choosing their strategies and recourse actions. If coalition











From condition (ii), we know that the expectation is well de¯ned, and hence the expected pro¯t
function too. Moreover, condition (iii) assures that every coalition has an optimal strategy that
maximizes its expected pro¯t.






In other words, the value of a coalition is the maximum expected pro¯t that the coalition can obtain
playing its optimal strategy and recourse actions. Therefore, we call the associated cooperative
game an expected pro¯t game.
The following theorem states that expected pro¯t games associated with stochastic cooperative
decision situations are totally balanced.
Theorem 3. Let (N;(Xi)i2N;(QS;MS)S22Nnf;g;C;(Hi)i2N) be a stochastic cooperative deci-
sion situation. Then the associated expected pro¯t game is totally balanced.
Proof. Consider a coalition T µN. Let ·T :2Tnf;g![0;1] be a balanced map. Let (qS¤)SµT:S6=;
and (mS¤(qS¤;xS))SµT:S6=;;xS2¨S be the optimal strategies and recourse actions of di®erent coali-
tions, respectively. Let tT =
P


















































































The ¯rst inequality follows since mT¤(tT;xT) 2 M(tT;xT) is an optimal recourse action and P
S22T nf;g·T(S)mS¤(qS¤;xS)2M(tT;xT) from condition (v). The ¯rst equality holds by de¯nition
of ZT and since mS¤
j = 0 for all j = 2 S for all S µ T. The second inequality holds since Hi(¢;xS) is




S22T nf;g:i2S ·T(S)=1 for all i2T. The second equality follows from interchanging the order
of summation. The last equality holds by de¯nition of ZS.


























































































The ¯rst equality holds since qT¤ and mT¤(qT¤;¢) are an optimal strategy and optimal recourse
actions for coalition T. The ¯rst inequality follows from tT 2 QT (condition (iv)). The second
inequality holds by (3). The third inequality follows from Theorem 1 since ¡C is a positively
homogeneous concave function (from condition (vii)) and ·T(S)¸0 for all S 2T in balanced map
·T. The last equality holds since qS¤ and mS¤(qS¤;¢) are an optimal strategy and optimal recourse
actions for coalition S, respectively. ¤
We remark that from the proof of Theorem 3, the associated cooperative game is balanced even
if conditions (iv) and (v) only hold for optimal strategies and recourse actions with T =N.
From Theorems 2 and 3, the following corollary follows immediately.
Corollary 1. Let (N;(Xi)i2N;(QS;MS)S22Nnf;g;C;(Hi)i2N) be a stochastic cooperative deci-
sion situation. Then the associated expected pro¯t game has a non-empty core.
4. Examples In this section, we present several example situations that ¯t into the general
framework in section 3. The ¯rst one concerns newsvendor situations with multiple warehouses
(see Ä Ozen et al. [16]).
Example 1. Newsvendor situations with multiple warehouses. Consider a set of retailers N,
who sell the same product in separate markets with stochastic demand. Because of long production
and transportation lead times, the retailers have to place their orders before the start of the selling
period without knowing the realization of stochastic demand, but knowing its distribution. After
the lead time elapses, the demand is realized and the orders become available at the warehouses.
Finally, the orders are sent to the retailers and the demand is satis¯ed as much as possible. Let Xi
be the stochastic demand of retailer i and let Fi be its cumulative distribution function. Moreover,
let xS denote a realization of demand vector XS = (Xi)i2S. The retailers can give their orders to
several warehouses. Let W be the set of warehouses and let Wi µW be the set of warehouses from
which retailer i can supply the goods. Let kw, fwi ¸ 0 and pi ¸ 0 be the unit cost of ordering toÄ Ozen, Norde, and Slikker: A general framework for cooperation under uncertainty
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warehouse w 2 W, the unit cost of transporting goods from warehouse w 2 W to retailer i 2 N
and selling price of retailer i, respectively. This newsvendor situation can be represented by the
tuple ¡ = (N;W;(Xi)i2N;(kw)w2W;(fwi)w2W;i2N;(Wi)i2N;(pi)i2N). In this newsvendor situation,
the retailers can increase their expected total pro¯t, if they cooperate. By cooperating, they decide
on a joint order and can allocate the joint order that becomes available at the warehouse after
demand realization. Hence, they bene¯t from inventory pooling and coordinated ordering. Consider
coalition S µN. Forming a coalition, the manufacturers can give a joint order to any manufacturing
facility that is available for any of them. Let WS = [i2SWi be the set of available facilities for
coalition S. Then, the set of possible order vectors is given by
QS :=fq 2I R
W
+ jqw =0 for all w = 2WS g:













w for all w 2WS:
Here, mS
wi denotes the amount of products that is sent from warehouse w to retailer i. We denote
the set of all possible allocations for order vector qS and realization xS of XS by MS(qS;xS). For





















Let mS¤(qS;xS)2M(qS;xS) be an optimal allocation maximizing RS(mS;xS). In the remainder of
this example, we refer to RS(mS¤(qS;xS);xS) as rS(qS;xS). The expected total pro¯t of coalition






In this newsvendor situation, we assume that the retailers in coalition S choose an order vector
and an allocation after demand realization to maximize their expected total pro¯t. The associated




In the following part of the example, we will show that (N;v¡) is an expected pro¯t game.
Consider a situation represented by ¤ = (N;(Xi)i2N;(QS;MS)S22Nnf;g;C;(Hi)i2N) with N, Xi,
QS, MS and C as in newsvendor situation ¡. Moreover, Hi :I R










In the following part of the example, we will check conditions (i)¡(vii) for ¤ to be a stochastic
cooperative decision situation. Conditions (i) and (iii) hold since the respective functions ZS(¢;xS)
and ¿S(¢) are continuous and we can easily derive that each maximum is obtained in a compact
set. Condition (ii) holds under the very mild and natural assumption: each random variable Xi
has a ¯nite expectation. We refer to Ä Ozen [14] for the formal proofs of conditions (i)-(iii). It isÄ Ozen, Norde, and Slikker: A general framework for cooperation under uncertainty
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easy to check that conditions (iv), (vi) and (vii) hold as well. The only condition left for ¤ to be a
stochastic cooperative decision situation is condition (v). Consider coalition T and realization xT of
XT. Let ·T :2Tnf;g ![0;1] be a balanced map. Moreover, let (qS)SµT 2
Q
SµT QS be a collection
order quantities and let (mS)SµT 2
Q
SµT MS (qS;xS) be a collection of allocations of production














w for all w 2WT: (5)




w for all w 2 W and
S µ T. Therefore, we conclude that the game (N;w¤) associated with ¤ is an expected pro¯t
game. Moreover, (N;w¤) and (N;v¡) coincide since for any coalition S µN, order vector qS 2QS,
realization xS of XS and allocation mS 2 MS(qS;xS), ZS(mS;xS) = RS(mS;xS) and, moreover,
¿S(qS)=¼S(qS). Therefore, cooperative game (N;v¡) is an expected pro¯t game, which is totally
balanced. §
The following example considers a production situation with random yield.
Example 2. Cooperative production with random yield. Consider a set of manufacturers N,
who produce an identical product every period to satisfy their deterministic demand. Production
can be performed in one or more production facilities, whose availability di®ers for each manufac-
turer. Let B denote the set of production facilities and let Bi µB be the set of production facilities
available for manufacturer i2N. Because of the nature of the production process, the production
yield is random in each production facility. Let Yj be the random variable representing the uncer-
tainty in production facility j for all j 2B. We assume that Yj is taking values in [0;1) usually close
to 1. The production yield of an order q 2I R+ given to production facility j depends on the realiza-
tion yj of Yj and is given by Lj
yj(q)=yjq. Let cj, pi, vi, bi and Di be the unit ordering cost at facility
j, selling price, salvage value, penalty cost and deterministic demand of manufacturer i, respectively.
We assume that cj ¸ 0 for all j 2 B, pi;vi;bi;Di ¸ 0 and pi +bi >vi for all i 2 N. This production
situation can be represented by a tuple ¡=(N;B;(Yj)j2B;(cj)j2B;(Bi)i2N;(pi)i2N;(vi)i2N;(bi)i2N).
In this production situation, the manufacturers can either work alone or they can cooperate in a
coalition. Being alone, a manufacturer gives an ordering decision and satis¯es his demand with the
random output as much as possible. On the other hand, if a group of manufacturers cooperates,
they decide on a joint order and can allocate the total production quantity to maximize their
total expected pro¯t. Hence, they bene¯t from reduced risk of random production and coordi-
nated ordering. This production situation ¯ts into the general framework in section 3 and it can
be represented as the tuple ¤ = (N;(Xi)i2N;(QS;MS)S22Nnf;g;C;(Hi)i2N) with entities speci¯ed
below.
Consider coalition S µ N. Forming a coalition, the manufacturers can give a joint order to any
manufacturing facility that is available for any of them. Let BS = [i2SBi be the set of available
facilities for coalition S. Then, the set of possible order vectors is given by
QS :=fq 2I R
B
+jqj =0 for all j = 2BS g:
Let Xi =(Yj)j2Bi be the vector representing randomness faced by manufacturer i and XS =(Xi)i2S.
Suppose that coalition S gives an order qS 2QS at a cost of C(qS)=
P
j2BS cjqS
j and the realization
of random vector XS appears to be xS. This leads to production output Lj
yj(qj) where yj is the
coordinate of some xi with j 2Bi associated with j 2BS. Note that yj is independent of selection ofÄ Ozen, Norde, and Slikker: A general framework for cooperation under uncertainty
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i with manufacturing facility j 2Bi. After the production quantities are known, the manufacturers
make an allocation decision represented by a matrix mS 2I R
B£N with
mS




yj(qj) for all j 2BS:
Here, mS
ji denotes the amount of products that is assigned in facility j to manufacturer i. We denote
the set of all possible allocations for order vector qS and realization xS of XS by MS(qS;xS). For




















In the following part of the example, we will show that (N;v¤) is an expected pro¯t game by
checking the conditions (i)¡(vii) for ¤ to be a stochastic cooperative decision situation1. Using
similar arguments and assumptions (i.e., E[Yj]<1 for all j 2B) as in Example 1, conditions (i),
(ii) and (iii) are met. It is easy to check that conditions (iv), (vi) and (vii) hold as well. The
only condition left for ¤ to be a stochastic cooperative decision situation is condition (v). Consider
coalition T and realization xT of XT. Let ·T : 2Tnf;g ! [0;1] be a balanced map. Moreover, let
(qS)SµT 2
Q
SµT QS be a collection of order quantities and let (mS)SµT 2
Q
SµT MS (qS;x) be a
















j ) for all j 2BS: (7)



































The last equality follows since Lj
yj is linear. Therefore, we conclude that the game (N;v¤) associ-
ated with ¤ is an expected pro¯t game, which is totally balanced. §
The following example considers a cooperative borrowing situation.
Example 3. Cooperative borrowing. Consider a set of companies N, who need to get loans to
support their operations in the following two periods. In the ¯rst period, each ¯rm i 2 N needs
deterministic amount of loan D1
i, whereas the need for the second period is stochastic and it is
denoted by random variable Xi. In the ¯rst period, the ¯rms have two loan options: 1-period loan
and 2-period loan. Let c1 and c2 be the unit costs of borrowing 1-period loan and 2-period loan,
1 We remark that the value of coalition S in (N;v
¤) is the maximum expected pro¯t that coalition S can obtain by
joint ordering and allocating the output optimally.Ä Ozen, Norde, and Slikker: A general framework for cooperation under uncertainty
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respectively. We assume that the cost of 2-period loan is lower than borrowing 1-period loan in
two periods separately, i.e., c2 ·2c1. We also assume that ¯rm i makes a ¯xed revenue pi form its
operations in the two periods and a unit revenue r by investing unused loans on several options
in each period. Moreover, we assume c2 ¡r > c1. For ease of presentation, we disregard the time
value of money. The sequence of events is as follows. At the start of the ¯rst period, the ¯rms
decide on how much 1-period and 2-period loan they would like to borrow. Afterwards, at the
start of the second period each ¯rm observes his loan need and borrows additional 1-period loan
accordingly. For each period, the available amount of loan should be at least what the ¯rms need.
This borrowing situation can be represented by a tuple ¡ = (N;(Di;Xi)i2N;c1;c2;(pi)i2N;r). In
this borrowing situation, the ¯rms can cooperate in a coalition to decrease their total expected
borrowing cost by making joint borrowing decisions, and hence increase their total expected pro¯t.
This borrowing situation ¯ts into the general framework in section 3 and it can be represented as
a tuple ¤=(N;(Xi)i2N;(QS;MS)S22Nnf;g;C;(Hi)i2N) with entities speci¯ed below.
Consider coalition S µ N. Forming a coalition, the companies can decide jointly how much 1-
period and 2-period loan to borrow. Observe that for the companies in S, it is optimal to order
the exact total amount of loan to cover their needs
P
i2S Di, since ordering more would create
extra cost for them, i.e., ordering extra 1-period loan is redundant since r < c2 ¡ c1 · c2=2 · c1,
and ordering extra 2-period loan is redundant since c2 ¡ r > c1 and hence it is better to borrow
1-period loan to cover possible needs in the second period. The problem can be formulated as how
much 2-period loan to borrow in the ¯rst period. Therefore, the set of possible loan vectors is given
by
QS :=fq 2I R+jq ·
P
i2S Dig:
Here, q denotes the amount of 2-period (long term) loan borrowed and the rest of the needs will be
covered by 1-period loans, which amount is
P
i2S Di ¡q. Let XS = (Xi)i2S be the random vector
representing randomness faced by coalition S. Suppose that coalition S borrows qS 2 QS at an
additional cost of C(qS)=(c2 ¡c1)qS. Note that the companies could also cover their needs in the
¯rst period by borrowing 1-period loan with a ¯xed cost c1
P
i2S Di. We will consider this cost
in the companies revenue functions and hence function C denotes the additional cost of ordering
2-period loan instead of 1-period loan in the ¯rst period. Moreover, suppose that the realization of
random vector XS appears to be xS. Hence, the ¯rms need in total
P
i2S xS
i loan for the second
period. Since they already have qS amount of loan from period 1, they can allocate this amount
among themselves and borrow additional 1-period loan if necessary. An allocation is represented








We denote the set of all possible allocations for borrowing qS and realization xS of XS by















In the following part of the example, we will show that (N;v¤) is an expected pro¯t game by
checking the conditions (i) ¡ (vii) for ¤ to be a stochastic cooperative decision situation2. From
2 We remark that the value of coalition S in (N;v
¤) is the maximum expected pro¯t that coalition S can obtain by
joint borrowing.Ä Ozen, Norde, and Slikker: A general framework for cooperation under uncertainty
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similar arguments and assumptions (i.e., E[Xi]<1 for all i2N) as in Example 1, conditions (i),
(ii) and (iii) are met. It is easy to check that conditions (iv), and (vii) hold as well. Condition (vi)
holds since c1 >r. The only condition left for ¤ to be a stochastic cooperative decision situation is
condition (v). Consider coalition T and realization xT of XT. Let ·T :2Tnf;g![0;1] be a balanced
map. Moreover, let (qS)SµT 2
Q
SµT QS be a collection of loans and let (mS)SµT 2
Q
SµT MS (qS;x)














It is easy to verify that (8) holds. (9) holds similar as (7) in Example 2. Therefore, we conclude
that the game (N;v¤) associated with ¤ is an expected pro¯t game, which is totally balanced. §
5. Concluding comments In this paper, we provided a framework for cooperative situations
under uncertainty. We focused on two types of structural elements in the construction of the
framework: strategy and recourse action spaces, and cost and revenue functions. We identi¯ed a set
of su±ciency conditions on these elements for the cooperative games associated with the situations
in this framework to have non-empty cores. We call the situations that satisfy these conditions and
their associated cooperative games stochastic cooperative decision situations and expected pro¯t
games, respectively. Some of these conditions have already been used implicitly to show that the
core is non-empty for special newsvendor situations in the literature (MÄ uller et al. [13] and Slikker
et al. [22]). Our proof technique di®ers from theirs in the following way. Our technique requires the
revenue functions to be concave whereas their technique requires pro¯t functions to be positively
homogeneous on order quantity and demand realization (a stronger condition). Moreover, with our
technique, it is also possible to handle convex cost structures.
After knowing that the cores of expected pro¯t games are non-empty, the ¯rst question one would
ask is whether there is a simple algorithm to determine a core division of total pro¯t. Unfortunately,
the way that we prove this result does not imply an algorithm for this purpose. There are two
recent studies studying this issue in newsvendor situations. In a recent study, Montrucchio and
Scarsini [12] showed that the core of a simple newsvendor game is non-empty by identifying a core
element. Chen and Zhang [5] considered cost games associated with the newsvendor situation with
multiple warehouses as introduced by Ä Ozen et al. [16]. They o®ered a way to ¯nd a core element
by solving the dual of a stochastic linear program. Moreover, they proved that it is NP-hard to
determine whether a given allocation of total pro¯t is in the core for the associated games, even in
a very simple setting. This result also holds for the expected pro¯t games considered in this paper.
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